

SPEECH

OF

HON. JOHN B. CLARK, OF MISSOURI,

ON

THE ADMISSION OF OREGON;

DELIVERED

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 11, 1859..

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1852

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SPEECH.

The House having under consideration the bill for the admission of Oregon—

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri, said:

Mr. SPEAKER: As a member of the Committee on Territories, I desire to detain the House for a short time, in stating the reasons which governed my vote in committee, and will govern it in this House, in favor of the bill for the admission of Oregon. I regret, sir, that the admission of any State is to be treated as a party question. The admission of a State is based on principles regulated by the Constitution of the United States, and legislators should vote upon such a question regardless of particular circumstances.

No gentleman should attempt to interpose obstacles to the admission of a State which has a population sufficient in numbers, and which, having been clothed with authority, has formed a republican constitution, and established its institutions in its own way. In my judgment such opposition is a high breach of power, unauthorized by the Constitution of our common country.

I now approach the objections urged against the admission of Oregon. One of the objections made in debate here, and which we had to meet in committee, is, that Oregon has not sufficient population. I take the ground that Oregon is entitled to admission into the Union with her present population, if it be sufficient, in the opinion of the House, to enable her to organize a practical community for State purposes.

I claim that Oregon has a right to come in under the ordinance of 1787, and that it is the duty of Congress to admit her on the same principle and according to the same rule established in that ordinance for the Northwest Territory. Sir, if gentlemen will read the organic act of Oregon, they will find that it is provided in that act that she shall be entitled to all the privileges, and subject to all the limitations, contained in the ordinance of 1787. That ordinance provided that when there should be sixty thousand inhabitants in those Territories, they should have a right to be admitted as States. If, then, you take the ordinance of 1787, and the organic act of Oregon, you can-

not escape the conclusion that you must admit Oregon when she has a population of sixty thousand. That portion of the ordinance of 1787 to which I refer, providing for the admission of these States, is as follows:

“ART. 5. There shall be formed in said Territory, not less than three, nor more than five, States; and the boundary of the States, as soon as Virginia shall alter her act of cession, and consent to the same, shall become fixed and established as follows, to wit: The western States in the said Territory shall be bounded by the Mississippi, the Ohio, and Wabash rivers; a direct line drawn from the Wabash and Port Vincent due north to the territorial line between the United States and Canada; and by the said territorial line to the Lake of the Woods and Mississippi. The middle States shall be bounded by the said direct line, the Wabash from Port Vincent to the Ohio; by the Ohio, by a direct line drawn due north from the mouth of the Great Miami to the said territorial line, and by the said territorial line. The eastern States shall be bounded by the last mentioned direct line, the Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the said territorial line: *Provided, however,* And it is further understood and declared, that the boundaries of these three States shall be subject so far to be altered, that if Congress shall hereafter find it expedient, they shall have authority to form one or two States in that part of the said territory which lies north of an east and west line drawn through the southerly bend or extreme of Lake Michigan; and whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted by its Delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever; and shall be at liberty to form a constitution and State government: *Provided,* The constitution and government so to be formed shall be republican and in conformity to the principles contained in these articles; and, so far as it can be consistent with the general interests of the Confederacy, such admission shall be allowed at an earlier period, and when there may be a less number of free inhabitants in the State than sixty thousand.”

Mr. HOWARD. I would ask the gentleman if he considers Oregon a part of the old Northwest Territory?

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. No, sir; but by the organic act of Oregon, the provisions of the ordinance of 1787 were extended to that Territory. Now, that ordinance provided that the Territories within the original Northwestern Territory should be admitted as States, when they had sixty thousand inhabitants; and the organic act of Oregon having extended to her all the privileges and limitations of that ordinance, gives her the

right of admission according to the terms of that ordinance, which will appear by the following portion of said act:

"And be it further enacted, That the inhabitants of said Territory shall be entitled to enjoy all and singular, the rights, privileges, and advantages granted and secured to the people of the territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, by the articles of compact contained in the ordinance for the government of said Territory, on the 13th day of July, 1787; and shall be subject to all the conditions and restrictions and prohibitions in said articles of compact, imposed upon the people of said Territory."

Mr. ZOLLICOFFER. I would ask the gentleman in what portion of the ordinance of 1787 he finds that provision?

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. In the fifth article.

Mr. ZOLLICOFFER. I would ask the gentleman if that same article does not provide that not more than five States shall be carved out of that Territory; and if that part of the compact does not also apply to Oregon? Can he take a part of the compact without taking the whole of it?

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. I will answer the gentleman. The fifth article of the ordinance of 1787 provides that five States may be admitted, but nevertheless it provides that Congress may admit other States. I will give a case in point. The terms of the ordinance of 1787, with the exception of the prohibition of slavery, were extended to Tennessee, which was south of the Ohio river. Now, when Tennessee applied for admission, the very question that we are now discussing was referred to a committee, and they made a report to Congress. I have the debates of that day before me, on which Mr. Madison, Mr. Macon, and Mr. Gallatin participated. It was held then that as Tennessee came within the provisions of the ordinance of 1787, except the slavery prohibition, Congress was bound to admit her when she had sixty thousand free inhabitants, and she was considered, as Mr. Gallatin says, *ipso facto* a State, whenever that fact appeared to Congress.

Mr. ZOLLICOFFER. By the permission of the gentleman from Missouri, I will state that when Tennessee was admitted, it was shown to Congress, by a census officially taken, that she had seventy-seven thousand two hundred and sixty-two inhabitants, while the ratio of representation was thirty-three thousand. The point to which I wish to call the attention of the gentleman from Missouri, is this—

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. The gentleman is taking too much of my time. Let me read for his information what Mr. Gallatin says:

"Mr. Gallatin, on the admission of Tennessee, was of opinion that the people of the southwestern territory became *ipso facto* a State the moment they amounted to sixty thousand free inhabitants, and that it became the duty of Congress as part of the original compact to recognize them as such, and to admit them into the Union, whenever they had satisfactory proof of the fact."

Now, the gentleman from Tennessee, in his report and in his remarks just now, states that when Tennessee applied for admission, it appeared by an official census that she had seventy-seven thousand two hundred and sixty-two inhabitants. So she had. But what has that to do with this question? The question we are now discussing is, what rights had Tennessee under the ordinance of 1787? It was argued by Madison and Macon and Gallatin that she had the right of

admission under that ordinance whenever she had sixty thousand inhabitants, because that ordinance provided that the five States to be carved out of the Northwestern Territory should be admitted when they had sixty thousand inhabitants; and that ordinance having been extended over the territory south of the Ohio, which included Tennessee, gave her all the privileges granted by the ordinance, including the right of admission when she had sixty thousand inhabitants. But, sir, this case is still plainer than that of Tennessee; for the organic act of Oregon not only extends the ordinance, as in the case of Tennessee, but expressly provides that the people of Oregon shall be entitled to all the privileges and subject to all the disabilities and all the incumbrances that the people of the Northwestern Territory, by virtue of that ordinance, were entitled and subject to.

Mr. KELLOGG. I desire to ask the gentleman one question. It is this; if, in his opinion, the act organizing the Territory of Oregon, is so binding upon this Congress that it cannot disregard it if, in its opinion, it ought to require a larger population?

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. I will answer the gentleman with great pleasure. I mean no disrespect, and make the application to no individual; but this Government is a Government of law. We are bound by the Constitution and by the laws. And when Congress makes an enactment, and sends it out as the will of the people of this nation, authorizing the people of a Territory to form a constitution and State government, for the purpose of being admitted into the Union, would the gentleman from Illinois, or any other man of honor, violate that compact?

Mr. KELLOGG. That compact to which the gentleman refers is esteemed but as an act of legislation; and I ask the gentleman now if the compact with Oregon of which he speaks was more sacred than the compact known as the Missouri compromise law, prohibiting slavery north of 36° 30'?

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. Not a particle.

Mr. KELLOGG. Where, then, was the honor in the repeal of that compact?

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. I will answer the gentleman, though it is wandering somewhat from the subject. The one was no more binding than the other; but the gentleman will remember that the Missouri compromise, as the gentleman's party declare, was canonized in the hearts of the people; and yet the gentleman will remember that when it was moved in Congress to extend that Missouri compromise line to the Pacific ocean, gentlemen of his party in Congress repudiated and spit upon it, and said that it was nothing more than an act of Congress, and that it was a slander upon the American mind to say that it was a sacred compact.

Mr. KELLOGG. A party in this Government refused to extend it, but never proposed to repeal it, never spit upon it; and I ask the gentleman to correct his quotation in regard to its being canonized in the hearts of the people, and ask him to give the credit of that sentiment to the Democratic party, or to one branch of the Democratic party.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. But I proceed. Oregon, then, in my judgment, is entitled to admission by the terms of the ordinance of 1787—

an act which has operated upon my mind, and which ought to have force with the Congress of the United States. I think, further, that the principle of population in nowise applies to Oregon. The act was passed by this House as an expression of the public will, and, with great unanimity, authorizing the people of Oregon to form a constitution, and establish a State form of government. The information went forth to the people of Oregon and to the people of Kansas at the same time, and both Territories made constitutions and applied for admission at the same session. Now, I appeal to the friends of the Kansas bill, and ask them why they voted for her admission? Was there any question of population raised then? Was it not well known that Kansas had not the requisite population for a Representative on this floor, and which is contended for here now? Why, then, vote for the admission of Kansas? It was because Kansas, in accordance with the precedent established in the admission of Michigan, and of many other States, in the Union, was invited to make a constitution and State form of government, without reference to population. That question was not raised. If Kansas was voted for regardless of the question of population, when she presented herself here, I appeal to every Democrat, to every friend of that bill, if they can now vote against the admission of Oregon upon that ground?

But it is contended that the passage of the bill, known as the English bill, which contains a prohibition of the admission of Kansas until she has a certain population, is a good precedent. I answer that that should have no effect upon Oregon. Oregon comes here as Kansas came. Oregon made her constitution when Kansas made hers; and she comes here upon that constitution and asks admission; and she is entitled to admission under the action of this House in passing the enabling act. I ask any gentleman of this House if it would not be extreme bad faith to Oregon to invite her to make a constitution regardless of population; and, when she comes here with a constitution framed under that invitation, and asks for admission, to require that she should, contrary to precedents heretofore established, have an amount of population which would entitle her to a Representative on this floor? To apply that rule to her would be retrospective action, in prejudice to Oregon, and in bad faith to the Government.

Mr. BINGHAM. The gentleman refers to the enabling act passed by the House of Representatives in the Thirty-Fourth Congress, as furnishing some reason why Congress should now admit Oregon. I desire the gentleman to notice this fact, that the enabling act to which he refers passed the House of Representatives, but did not pass the Senate; and it limited the exercise of the power to form a constitution in the Territory of Oregon to citizens of the United States exclusively; and that, with that provision in it, it passed the House by an almost unanimous vote. And this constitution is in distinct contravention of that provision.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. Oregon has a right, then, to claim admission according to the usages of this Government in reference to the admission of other States. The State of the gentleman who sits before me was admitted when she had far less than a representative population. Michigan and

other States were admitted, when the smallness of the population was never urged as an objection.

Mr. HOWARD. I concede that that is a fact as applied to my State; but I desire to call the gentleman's attention to one fact, in order that he may shape his argument to answer it. He states that Oregon and Kansas came here at the same time, and both upon the same basis, claiming admission. He claims that the treatment should be alike; yet he hangs Kansas up until she has a population of ninety-three thousand four hundred and twenty, and proposes to admit Oregon without any reference to her population.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. I now give notice that I shall not yield any more of my time for interruptions. The gentleman says that a rule is applied to Kansas different from that applied to Oregon. I deny that proposition. The rule applied to Kansas is as to her future action, and the rule attempted to be applied to Oregon is as to her action in the past; it is retrospective. Oregon comes here with her constitution, framed long ago; and the same rule that we propose to apply to her we agreed to apply to Kansas, but Kansas rejected the constitution with which she came here. I would have gone for the admission of Kansas, under that constitution, notwithstanding her population. But so long as I am a member upon this floor, I will never vote to admit any Territory as a State after this, that has not a population equal to that required for a Representative from my State. It is the true doctrine. It is the doctrine of the Constitution, and the doctrine of representative government. Oregon has made her constitution under the former policy of the Government, and she did so with the *prima facie* approbation of Congress. She had the express approbation of Congress by the passage of a law here, enabling her to call a convention and frame a constitution of State government.

Now, Mr. Chairman, it has been urged that Oregon ought not to be admitted, because her constitution is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the genius of this Government. It is alleged that she allows others than citizens of the United States to participate in the exercise of the elective franchise. My friend from Tennessee [Mr. MAYNARD] places his objection mainly upon that ground. This is a grave question; one that strikes directly at the sovereignty of the States. As a State-rights Democrat, believing that the stability of our Government and the liberty of our people depend upon the maintenance of State sovereignty, I would yield the power here objected to more reluctantly than any other. None ever pretended, unless the veriest Federalist who advocated consolidation—I was about saying despotism—who advocated consolidation of the Federal Government, ever contended that the United States had the right to control the action of the States as to who were and who were not entitled to the privilege of the elective franchise. Whenever it is maintained that the General Government can interfere for the control of that power by the States, sir, I would not give a straw for the freedom of our institutions. For, Mr. Speaker, when the liberties of the people and the sovereignty of the several States are made subservient to the centralized power of the General Government, then we would have one of the greatest despotisms of ancient or modern times.

The doctrine of State rights and State sovereignty was the doctrine that nerved the hearts of our ancestors, and kindled the beacon-fires of the Revolution. It is the last thing the patriot will cling to. I believe that what rights the Federal Government has are derived altogether from the consent of the States. They have surrendered up so much power as, and no more than, was necessary for the general protection and the general welfare; and whenever the Federal Government assumes powers not granted, then it undertakes the exercise of powers which amount to tyranny.

It is objected that the constitution of Oregon is unconstitutional, and that she ought not to be admitted as a State, because she permits alien suffrage. She has a right to allow it. Every State has the right to confer the right of suffrage on whoever it pleases. Every State is entitled to regulate its own internal policy—to say who shall and who shall not vote. I appeal particularly to the members from the South. Whenever we surrender the right to determine who shall vote in the States, we do not know how soon we will be deprived of suffrage ourselves. It is a great right, and should be clung to by every State-rights Democrat as the last hope of the country. I grant that I would not allow a foreigner to vote in any State. I would only allow citizens of the United States. I would not allow any colored man to vote. If gentlemen in Massachusetts, however, allow negroes to vote, that is their own affair. The States, in their internal policy, have the right to select their own company. I have no right, we have no right, to interfere with them. The question of the right of suffrage was one that was mooted in the formation of the Constitution of the United States. As one of the rights of the States, it was regarded as one of the very pillars of the Union. The gentleman from New York [Mr. GRANGER] stated, that while the constitution allowed aliens to vote, it excluded free negroes from the State. He stated that was inequality. While the constitution of his State allows negroes to vote, does it allow them to vote on an equal footing with white persons?

Mr. MORGAN. We allow them to vote. More than one hundred of them voted for me.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. He does vote in New York, but not on an equality with the white man.

Mr. MORGAN. The negro does vote in New York. More than a hundred voted for me.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. The constitution of New York requires a property qualification for the colored voter, and not for the white man.

Mr. CLARKE B. COCHRANE. That is so.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. By the constitution of New York, a negro must be worth \$200 before he is equal to the white man.

Mr. CLARK, of New York. Two hundred and fifty dollars.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. Well, sir, a white man in New York can vote without property, and the negro has to have property. Now, where is your equality? Why, formerly, in Virginia, under her old constitution, a man had not only to be free and white, but to be an owner of land, before he was permitted to vote in that old Commonwealth, which is said to be the "mother of States and statesmen," and to have given laws to this great Confederacy. No one has ever contended

that she had not a right to do it. In the State of Missouri we make no such distinction. All free white men above the age of twenty-one can vote, whether they are rich or poor. We have universal suffrage, which is the true principle. But we require residence as a precedent to the right to vote, and so do nearly all the States? Why is that? Why can that power be exercised? It is because the States have a right to regulate their own affairs, and to govern the right of suffrage in their own way. The Government of the United States has no right at all to interfere in the matter.

But another objection made to the admission of Oregon is, that she has excluded free negroes. That objection comes with a bad grace from many gentlemen upon this floor. Sir, how many States of this Union are there that have excluded free negroes? Does not Ohio exclude them?

Mr. BINGHAM. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. She did, I believe, when the Republicans had control of the State. Illinois excludes them; Indiana excludes them; and, I believe, several of the New England States exclude them.

Mr. BINGHAM. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. They do it by statute, if not by constitutional provision. The doctrine is, that you can exclude them by statute, but not by the fundamental law of the land; and it is a strange doctrine, indeed.

Mr. GILMAN. Will the gentleman state what New England State excludes free negroes?

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. I may be in error about the New England States; but I think Connecticut does.

Mr. DEAN. No, sir; the gentleman is mistaken.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. Well, I know that negroes are great favorites in New England, and perhaps they do not exclude them.

Now, I take the ground, Mr. Speaker, (which may not be very acceptable to some gentlemen here,) that the negro is not, and cannot be, a citizen of the United States. As a lawyer, I draw my views of the construction of the Constitution of my country from those contemporaneous with its formation, and those luminaries who are placed upon the bench of your courts to construe and expound the laws and that Constitution which I am sworn to support; and I am not so vain or so presumptuous as to set up my judgment above the judgment of those to whom the peculiar duty is confided of expounding and construing it. Sir, it is the duty of every good citizen to obey the laws of the land. The laws of the land are made by the Congress of the United States, and it is the duty of every good citizen to obey those laws as expounded and construed by the judiciary.

Now, sir, it was said yesterday, by the honorable member from Tennessee, [Mr. MAYNARD,] that "citizens" and "people" meant the same thing. Well, in one sense, they do mean the same thing.

Mr. MAYNARD. Will the gentleman permit me to explain the extent of my remark. I meant within the purview of the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. In the sense of the Constitution of the United States they mean the same thing, but the gentleman gives them a

wrong application. "Citizens" and "people" mean the same thing in the view of the Constitution, but only when the citizen is a part of the body politic. But do gentlemen suppose that, when the framers of the Constitution used the word "citizens," they meant negroes? They had not advanced as far as some of our friends have at this day. Sir, they never meant to include slaves or Africans in the terms "people" or "citizens." Never. I have the highest authority under this Government for saying that they meant no such thing. In the Dred Scott case, Judge Taney, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said:

"The words people of the United States and citizens are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body, who, according to our Republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their Representatives. They are what are familiarly called the sovereign people, and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement (Dred Scott was a negro) compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and were not intended to be included under the word citizens, in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for, and secures to, citizens of the United States."

And again he said:

"In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union."

In the same opinion we find the following:

"It does not by any means follow, because he has the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State; for previous to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States every State had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen, and to endow him with all its rights; but this character of course was confined to the boundaries of the State, and gave him no rights or privileges in other States, beyond those secured to him by the laws of nations and the comity of States. Nor have the several States surrendered the power of conferring these rights and privileges by adopting the Constitution of the United States. Each State may still confer them upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper; or upon any class or description of persons; yet he would not be a citizen, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, nor entitled to sue as such in one of its courts; nor to the privileges and immunities of a citizen in the other States. The rights which he would acquire would be restricted to the State which gave them."

Now, it is strange to me to find gentlemen upon this floor objecting to alien suffrage at this late day. Why, sir, the first constitution of Illinois allowed aliens to vote. They allow them now to vote after a very short residence. And aliens have been permitted to vote in all the territories, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Grow] has time and again voted for territorial bills allowing it. Did he not do it in the case of Oregon and of Minnesota? Has he not done it in the case of every Territory that has been organized since he has been in Congress? Now, my position is, that while I would not vote for alien suffrage, still it is a matter for the State of Oregon to determine. It would be a dangerous precedent for Congress to interfere with such a matter. We have no right or power to do it. So, too, with reference to the exclusion of free negroes; it is a matter for their own decision. Negroes

are not citizens, and, therefore, cannot be included in that clause of the Constitution which provides that the citizens of each State shall have the same rights as citizens of other States. They are not citizens in the contemplation of the Constitution, and do not come within that provision.

Then it is said further that the courts of the country are closed against this class of people. Is it not the right of a State to declare who shall be entitled to sue in her courts? Can anybody but a citizen of the United States do it? Has not the court decided that a negro is not a citizen of the United States? And will you force a State to receive within its limits persons whom the State is not willing to admit? You would then establish for Oregon a rule which is contrary to the rule established by the highest court of the country for all the States, and you threaten to exclude her because she has done as other States have done in excluding free negroes. I ask is that fair? is it just? and is there a man upon this floor who could maintain his self-respect and vote to exclude her upon those grounds?

Mr. KELLOGG. I would ask the gentleman if there has been any other State before this, which has excluded all persons of color from suing in their courts?

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. I cannot be interrupted. I now come to the consideration of the last objection, and that is, that Oregon has not a sufficient population. Now, I claim that Oregon should be admitted without regard to population. I urge that Oregon ought to be admitted, even though she has less than sixty thousand inhabitants, because she had a right to believe she would be admitted, from the fact that the Government proposed that she should form a constitution, and also because that constitution was formed before the enactment of the English bill. But I claim that Oregon has a sufficient population; I claim that she has more than one hundred thousand people within her borders, and I bring up, to sustain my position, the declarations of gentlemen upon this floor, who know, or ought to know, the facts in the case. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, [Mr. Grow,] last Congress, stated that from all the information he then had, Oregon had ninety thousand people—two years ago last February; that she had a population nearly equal to the ratio of representation upon this floor. This is the avowal of one upon this floor, who had the right to know. But the gentleman from Pennsylvania said he made his statement based upon information obtained from the Delegate from Oregon. Is not that Delegate now here? Is he not entitled to as much credit now, as then? Has he not been among his people since that day, and does he not know more about them now than he did then, and are not his assertions entitled to the same weight as then?

Mr. GROW. I hope the gentleman does not understand me as questioning now the veracity of the Delegate from Oregon.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. I understood that you did.

Mr. GROW. I stated that was my authority, without raising any question of veracity about the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. CLARK, of Missouri. The gentleman says he raises no question of veracity. Then why is he talking about it? But I did not intend

to raise any question of veracity between the gentleman from Pennsylvania and the gentleman from Oregon. My remarks were made in a spirit of kindness. I wanted to say that the Delegate from Oregon was believed by the gentleman then; and I hoped that no occurrence had taken place which would diminish that confidence now. He gives the same information now as then; and not only that, but he gives additional information, which places her population far above the ratio required for a Representative here. That I may do no injustice, I ask the Delegate to state here, upon this floor, what he now believes to be the population of Oregon?

Mr. LANE. Being called upon to state what I know and what I believe in reference to the population of Oregon, I will do so as briefly as possible. As was stated yesterday by my friend from Georgia, [Mr. STEPHENS,] at the head of the Committee on Territories, our population, in 1850, amounted to about ten thousand. In 1855 we had a census taken, but it was not a complete one. It did not do justice to Oregon as to the number of her people. The return, however, as made in 1855, was forty-three thousand four hundred. Since that time there has been no census taken; but I will say to the House that the increase of population has been going on constantly from that time to this; and that the House may know the extent of that increase of population, I will state the increase in Douglas county, the county in which I reside. I happened to be at home in 1855, when the census was taken. I was called upon by the assessor, who was required, at the same time that he made the assessment, to take the census of the inhabitants. That year there were not over two or three hundred families in that county; there were no towns, and no settlements, save one of half a dozen houses. I came here that fall, and returned in the spring of 1857. Then I found that, in the mean time, a county seat had been located at Roseburg; that the population had increased to about one thousand people; that, instead of having to go one hundred and forty miles to get our wheat ground, we had two fine flouring mills almost in sight of my house; that every vacant quarter section of land in that county had

been taken up; and that the county could give more votes than they had entire population two years before. The country has been settling up at that rate from that day to this; and it is safe to say that we have now, in Oregon Territory, more than the population requisite for the representation of one member upon this floor. We have the requisite white population.

My friend from South Carolina, [Mr. BOYCE,] and I regret to see that he is not in his seat, referred two years ago, in some remarks he made, to the statement of Bishop Scott, given to the public in New York city. Bishop Scott went out to Oregon, established his churches, and returned with a view of getting aid for their continuance. He left in 1855, and returned the Congress before the last. He was in Oregon when the last census was taken. It was then understood and acknowledged that that census did not do justice to the Territory. In truth, there were fully fifty thousand people then there.

Bishop Scott, speaking of the extent of Oregon, its resources, &c., said that, with a population of fifty thousand scattered all over the Territory, over an immense Territory, it would be seen how necessary it was to afford aid for his churches. We have no better man than the Bishop upon the face of the earth. Though the census stated there were forty-three thousand and odd, the Bishop stated there were fifty thousand, and that was the basis upon which he spoke. There is a letter in the hands of the gentleman from Connecticut, [Mr. ARNOLD,] from Inspector General Mansfield, of the United States Army. That gentleman went all through Oregon on a tour of inspection, before the census referred to was taken. He inspected all the military posts and the forces stationed at them. Last summer he was ordered back to Oregon, and he made another tour of that Territory. In the letter I have referred to he states that he found the Willamette valley had settled up thickly and was continuing rapidly to fill up. The farms were in good order, and the prospects there were of the brightest character. He believed that the population of Oregon had increased four-fold since his former visit.

[Here the hammer fell.]